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ABSTRACT 
 
Water Infrastructure Challenges in Urbanizing Environments: 
A Case Study of the 2009 Logan Canal Landslide 
by 
Kathryn Davis Henderson, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2012 
Major Professor: Dr. Joanna Endter-Wada 
Department: Environment and Society 
 Social constructions, or frames, often determine how and to whom benefits and burdens 
are delivered by public policy. Triggering events often open policy windows in which drastic 
policy changes can occur. In July of 2009, a wet, steep hillside failed in Logan, Utah, leveling a 
home below and destroying an irrigation canal that ran along the hill. The resulting policy 
changes illustrated how social constructions of agricultural producers in terms of deservedness 
and power shifted, both as a result of urbanization and as a result of the landslide. Policy 
processes are often path-dependent and decisions can become self-reinforcing. Analyzing the 
pathway that led up to the landslide provided insights into the importance of proactive 
management and long-term planning of water infrastructure, especially in urbanizing 
environments. By using policy and discourse analysis, this thesis highlights water management 
challenges involved in the urbanizing arid U.S. Intermountain West and how planners and 
policymakers can use this information to achieve democratic policy solutions. 
(82 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
Water Infrastructure Challenges in Urbanizing Environments: 
A Case Study of the 2009 Logan Canal Landslide 
Kathryn Davis Henderson 
In July, 2009 in Logan, Utah, a wet, steep hillside failed, leveling a home below and 
destroying an irrigation canal that ran along the hill. Three people were killed. The event and the 
resulting policy changes present an opportunity to uncover how frames, or social constructions, 
play into the policy development cycle. This case also uncovers the nuances involved when old 
infrastructure takes on new social meanings. Planners and policymakers that pay attention to 
frames and social dimensions may be able to minimize conflict. 
The landslide received immediate media attention and spurred state legislation on canal 
safety.  The event had an effect on how agricultural producers like farmers and canal shareholders 
were perceived. Perception of a group’s deservedness and power often determine how benefits 
and burdens are delivered to them through policy. The tensions between how farmers are 
“framed” by others and how they are delivered benefits have been highlighted using newspaper 
articles, state legislation and code, and the documents prepared as part of the Environmental 
Impact Study,  
This case study is relevant because it is an example of the social challenges involved in 
infrastructure upgrades. The canal system in Cache Valley is over a century old and in need of 
repair. Throughout the United States, water infrastructure systems like dams, drainage systems, 
and treatment facilities are reaching the point where they will need upgrading or replacement. 
Many of these facilities have social significance, as the old open canals do in Cache Valley. 
Understanding how the public defines and assigns meaning to these systems is important for 
finding equitable solutions in planning and policy. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Interactions between humans and the natural environment is an important focus of 
human dimensions fields of natural resource management and ecosystem science 
including environmental economics, sociology, and geography. Humans interact with 
natural systems directly and indirectly. Even actions that seem unrelated to natural 
systems have direct and indirect connections to natural systems. The focus of this thesis 
is the interaction of people with water through infrastructure technology in a specific case 
study setting. .  
 The importance of technology in human society is often under-emphasized. Bijker 
(2008) discusses the critical role of technology in shaping human values and interactions, 
and the role of human values and contexts in shaping technology. Technology is 
mistakenly viewed as autonomous and value free (Bijker 2008, p. 683) when, in reality, 
technology is subjective, shaped by social factors, and framed by social and political 
forces.  
 Because water is critical for human life, water technology is a critical part of 
society. In the industrializing United States, centralized water treatment facilities and 
sewer systems were one of the most important steps in improving health and quality of 
life in US cities (Cutler and Miller 2004) that had been battling cholera and other water-
borne diseases (Lens et al. 2001). Water infrastructure projects installed in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century made agricultural production possible in arid regions like the 
Intermountain West of the United States (Reisner 1986). 
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 After water infrastructure is built, it needs to be maintained and regularly replaced 
because pipes and cement corrode, walls crumble, and canal banks erode over time. If 
communities stayed the same in terms of population and water demand, then that regular 
maintenance would be enough. However, communities change over time. Many places in 
the U.S. Intermountain West are undergoing changes that researchers characterize as the 
rural-to-urban shift, or an urbanization of formerly rural areas through population growth 
and economic development. In this region, many rural areas are becoming urbanized by 
increased regional in-migration, which some attribute to the amenity values provided by 
scenic landscapes and open-space (McGranahan 2008), and the lower costs of living and 
population densities (Henrie and Plane 2008). In these formerly rural areas, water 
infrastructure like dams and ditches that were constructed for agricultural purposes now 
have to support more urban uses. 
 In addition to the infrastructure systems coming under pressure to support more 
diversified water uses or increased capacities in the Intermountain West, the traditional 
pro-agricultural approaches used by water managers and decision makers are being 
questioned by a more urban population. The preference for water allocations for raising 
crops and for state and federal subsidies to support those activities is no longer a given 
(Ingram 1982; Wahl 1989). Increased demands for environmental and aesthetic 
considerations like water quality, aquatic wildlife, and scenic beauty all complicate the 
public policy and planning decision making spheres. Members of the public can frame 
events or recipients of policy benefits in ways that support or oppose policy actions. In 
the public discourse, coalitions and individuals use different frames to compete for 
desired policy outcomes (Hajer 1995). 
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 Cache County, Utah is an ideal setting to investigate both the challenges of 
managing and upgrading water infrastructure in an urbanizing environment and the 
tensions created by controversial discourse about water infrastructure decisions. Cache 
County is located in the U.S. Intermountain West in the northern part of Utah just south 
of the Idaho border. It has been an important agricultural production region since its 
settlement by pioneers of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (commonly 
called the Mormon church) in the 1850s. Over the last forty years, Cache County has 
seen rapid population growth. The county population has grown at a rate of 23.3% over 
the last decade alone (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Towns and cities have grown and 
expanded, sprawling into farmland, which is disappearing at a rate of 600 acres a year, 
according to some estimates (Bear River Association of Governments 2012).  
 In 2009, a wet steep hillside in Logan, known as the Logan Bluff, failed, leveling 
a home below, killing three people, and destroying a section of an old irrigation canal. 
The landslide was not the first in the area, but it was the first to ever cause loss of human 
life. The event sparked a state legislative response and federal funding was provided 
through the Natural Resources Conservation Service to repair the canal and restore 
irrigation delivery to canal shareholders including farmers and municipalities. The 
reconstruction project enabled the privately owned canal company to make upgrades to 
the canal that will make it more functionally suitable to the current urbanized context. 
This process is analyzed in Chapter II. The reconstruction project became a source of 
controversy because many members of the public felt that the canal company did not 
deserve the federal financial assistance for a variety of reasons. The different “frames” 
embedded in the public discourse are the subject of Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER II 
PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE COSTS OF COMPLACENCY: 
 A CASE STUDY OF THE LOGAN CANAL DISASTER1 
In the past few decades, cities in the Intermountain West region of the United 
States have undergone a period of rapid population growth and economic development, 
which has placed added pressure on the region’s limited water supplies (Anderson and 
Woolsey, 2005). Two approaches dominate the current strategy to manage urban water 
supplies in the West: reallocating water among different users, and increasing water use 
efficiency to prevent waste (Western Governors’ Association, 2006, 2008; Western 
Water Policy Review Commission, 1998). Reallocation efforts include importing water 
from other areas, transferring water from agriculture to urban uses, and facilitating trades 
from lower to higher economic uses through water markets (Anderson et al., 2012; Howe 
and Easter, 2011; MacDonnell and Rice, 2008; National Research Council, 1992, 2002; 
Sax 2008). Water reallocation has been controversial in many instances. Most states 
attempt to improve water use efficiency by promoting human behavioral changes in water 
use or through upgrading infrastructure by lining or piping canals and installing water 
technology controls to better monitor and manage water quantity (American Water 
Works Association, 2006; Clayton and Meyers, 2009; Western Resource Advocates, 
2003). 
 Upgrading water infrastructure has been identified as an important challenge in 
the United States (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2010; Copeland and Tiemann, 
2010). In the latter half of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, 
large-scale federally sponsored projects were installed throughout the Intermountain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This manuscript co-authored by Kathryn Davis Henderson and Dr. Joanna Endter-Wada 
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West in order to facilitate settlement and agricultural production (Ingram, 1982; Reisner, 
1986; Wilkinson, 1992). Many water infrastructure facilities like reservoirs and canals, 
which are vital to agricultural and urban uses in the Intermountain West region, are 
reaching the end of their designed life expectancy and are in need of repairs, upgrades, or 
replacements (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2010). Rapid population growth has 
put added strain on already aging water systems throughout the region. Several factors 
currently inhibit federal agencies from replacing water infrastructure in the same 
expedient manner in which it was first installed, including political arguments for 
reducing government’s role and promoting the private sector, competing demands on 
government budgets oftentimes in financial deficit, and the requirements of newer 
environmental laws. 
 In Utah, the first modern water infrastructure was constructed by Mormon settlers 
in the mid-nineteenth century (Harvey, 1989; Sadler and Roberts, 1994). The original 
intent of that infrastructure was to deliver irrigation water to farms and pastures. Now 
that many areas in Utah are transitioning from rural to urban land uses and political 
designations, this infrastructure is not only aging, but is functionally inadequate to meet 
new urban needs (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2011; Utah Division of Water 
Resources, 2005). 
 This paper outlines the events and decisions leading up to a federally-funded 
reconstruction project of a privately-owned canal system in Logan, Utah after a tragic 
irrigation canal collapse. On July 11, 2009, a landslide occurred along a section of the 
Logan Northern (LN) canal that runs along a steep hillside known as the Logan Bluff. 
The landslide caused the complete breach and failure of the canal. Three people were 
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killed in the disaster when the house they were living in was destroyed. The failed section 
of the canal was closed, and irrigation delivery of water to LN shareholders was 
disrupted.  
The landslide inspired state legislation pertaining to canal safety management 
(Hunsaker, 2011; Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act of 2010). The Emergency 
Watershed Protection (EWP) fund, which is administered by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS), delivered funds to the community to reconstruct the canal 
and restore water delivery. The LN and the neighboring Logan Hyde Park Smithfield 
(LHPS) canal companies merged to create a single private canal company, the Cache 
Highline Water Association, in order to facilitate a project that would combine the two 
canals in an effort to make a single, more efficient system (Utah Board of Water 
Resources, 2010). Cache County agreed to be the contracting agency and to coordinate 
the project, and county officials worked with the NRCS to prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS). The EIS was completed and a Record of Decision (ROD) was 
filed in October 2011. All of the cities that are serviced by the canals have agreed to 
finance their share of the project. Construction begins in 2012. 
The landslide and subsequent policy responses are embedded in and influenced by 
the history and context of water management and land-use planning in Cache County. 
Many of the forces at work in Cache County exist in other communities in the 
Intermountain West: urban population growth, transfer of water from agriculture to urban 
uses, and aging and inadequate water infrastructure. The decisions made in response to 
these forces may have far-reaching effects in the future (Pierson, 2004). The primary 
objectives in conducting a situational, case study analysis of the Logan Canal disaster are 
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to: 1) trace the path dependency of changes in water infrastructure management 
participants, goals, and strategies; pinpoint critical decision points that shaped consequent 
events; and, interpret the water policy and planning challenges that such changes present 
for the urbanization of formerly agricultural land. 
THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
 Paul Pierson (2000; 2004) analyzes how political processes can be “path 
dependent,” and characterizes the phenomenon in terms of increasing returns. “Each step 
along a particular path produces consequences which make that path more attractive for 
the next round. As such effects begin to accumulate, they generate a powerful virtuous 
(or vicious) cycle of self-reinforcing activity” (Pierson, 2000, p. 254). Increasing returns 
describe the rising “costs of switching to some previously plausible alternative” (2004, p. 
21). Because switching pathways later in a particular historical trajectory can be difficult, 
relatively small decisions early on end up having a large effect on the direction of 
subsequent policies.  
 Technology development offers many examples of path dependence. If multiple 
technologies compete to provide similar functions, the technology that can attain “an 
edge may trigger positive feedback effects that may lock in the technology, excluding 
competitors,” even if later on, other options may be superior (Pierson, 2004, p. 23; also 
see Bijker, 2008). In the development of water infrastructure, technology built in the 
1800s and early 1900s still provides a large portion of water-related services today 
(Copeland and Tiemann, 2010), even though other, more efficient technology options 
currently exist. In technology development, being “first” lends a distinct advantage, even 
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if “the eventual outcome may not be of maximum possible benefit” (Arthur, 1994, p. 
112).  
 The water policies and management strategies pertaining to the Logan Canal 
system can be interpreted as path dependent in two ways. First, water laws and policies 
like prior appropriation, beneficial use, and private-company control over water delivery, 
which were designed to promote agricultural development in the 1800s, are still in place 
throughout the West, generally, and in Utah, in particular (Harvey, 1989; Ingram, 1982). 
Second, the technological infrastructure used to deliver irrigation water in Logan has 
remained largely unchanged, despite the current existence of more efficient technologies. 
 Planning strategies employed by decision-makers are often path-dependent as 
well. Once planning procedures are established, they tend to remain in place (Cortner and 
Moote, 1999; Henderson 2001). This has led to problematic consequences in natural 
resources management and planning (Holling, 1978). In recent decades, “adaptive 
management” has been advocated by scientists and professionals (see Everett et al., 1994; 
Holling, 1978) as a way to “[plan] for and [adapt] to surprise,” by constantly 
incorporating new information into planning strategies (Lessard, 1999, p. 87). Planners 
and decision-makers of the Logan Canal have relied on traditional planning approaches. 
 The tendency for technology, policy, and planning to be path dependent is 
problematic when societies undergo rapid changes (Pierson, 2004). Irrigation water 
infrastructure in Logan, Utah, was built in a very different societal context than the one in 
which the irrigation system is embedded today, mostly due to rapid urban population 
growth and urbanization of land (Bear River Association of Governments, 2012; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1995) over the last few decades. Path dependence of water management 
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and infrastructure in a changing societal context forms the underlying framework of our 
analysis. We focus on the role of important decision points and how they contribute to the 
historical trajectory, particularly in regards to times when choices about whether or not to 
upgrade the irrigation delivery technology were addressed. 
 We also draw upon Endter-Wada and Blahna’s (2011) Linkages to Public Lands 
(LPL) Framework. The LPL Framework is a tool aimed at helping managers and planners 
integrate social factors in the analytic processes used for decision-making by mapping 
various “human linkages” to public land. People can be linked indirectly or directly to 
public land, and these linkages are part of the environment of public land that agencies 
need to assess in scientific and NEPA analyses, deal with in on-going management 
activities, and address because they influence public involvement and planning processes 
and outcomes. Endter-Wada and Blahna identify five primary linkage categories: tribal, 
use, neighboring land, interest, and decision-making linkages.  
Although the LPL framework was developed for use in public land settings, the 
canal system in Cache County that transports the publicly-owned resource of water can 
also be viewed as a public resource people are linked to in similar ways. Since the 
primary focus of this analysis is on change affecting the management of the Logan canal 
system over time, we integrate the LPL framework with the dynamics of path 
dependency, arguing that changes over time in linkages people have to the Logan canal 
system contributed to dilemmas confronted in the wake of the Logan Bluff landslide.  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Several case studies focusing on water management in the U.S. West have 
explored the effects of urbanization in formerly rural areas. The case studies highlight the 
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importance of coordination between urban planning and agricultural water policy (Lucero 
and Tarlock, 2003); the impacts of agriculture-to-urban water transfers on communities 
(Howe et al., 1990; Natural Resources Council, 1992); and the role of different strategies 
for improving the efficient delivery, use, and management of water, including 
engineering solutions (El Chami et al., 2011) and social, educational, and economic 
programs (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992; Roccaro et al., 2011). This case study adds 
a temporal focus to the analysis of decision-making and policy outcomes in contexts of 
rural-to-urban transitions in water use. 
The case study approach is necessarily context-based and, unlike other 
approaches that attempt to decontextualize data by using statistical tools to eliminate 
interaction effects, the case-specific interactions are of special interest (Brady and 
Collier, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Ragin, 1987). Certain analytic trade-offs are involved in 
using this approach. By limiting the scope of the analysis to one case, the ability to 
generalize is limited. However, contextual information is crucial to understanding the 
policy process and context-based analysis adds “sensitivity to causal complexity and 
contextual effects with aspirations to draw out implications about social processes that 
transcend a single setting” (Pierson, 2004, p. 169). Adopting an “explicitly temporal 
focus” (Pierson, 2004, p. 178) lends more insight to a case than a snapshot or a 
decontextualized comparative approach. Neumann (2011) notes that the main advantage 
of the case study approach is to examine the effects of general phenomena on a specific 
setting. Since the focus of our analysis is on the interacting effects of aging infrastructure, 
urbanization, and population growth in Logan and how these affected policy decisions, a 
case study approach is appropriate for helping us trace how linkages to water through the 
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canal infrastructure changed over time and how path dependencies help explain the canal 
disaster and public responses to it. 
Data Gathering  
Data was gathered through observational and ethnographic approaches by 
attending and observing public meetings and collecting public documents (See 
Appendix). Public meetings included those held in 2010-2011 that specifically addressed 
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of the canal reconstruction project and other 
meetings and conferences that addressed canal management issues in general and the 
Logan canal case specifically, including the 2010, 2011, and 2012 Northern Utah Mini 
Water Conferences in Logan, Utah. Various historic, public, planning, legislative, and 
policy documents and news reports were gathered to provide insights into the changing 
social context and management strategies of the canals and to pinpoint important events. 
These documents included the EIS materials published during the NEPA process, 
planning meeting notes from public and canal shareholder meetings, and the Water 
Conveyance Facilities Safety Act of 2010, a state legislative bill passed in response to the 
Logan Bluff landslide. Sources of public discourse included comments submitted during 
the NEPA process of producing the EIS and letters-to-the-editor in the local newspaper, 
The Herald Journal. In addition, presentations given to the Water Law and Policy class at 
Utah State University from January to April 2011 by professionals, key citizens, and 
legislators involved in the Logan Canal reconstruction EIS process provided some 
preliminary data. Personal communications with public officials also informed the 
process and provided insights. 
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Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data included content analysis, discourse analysis, and theory 
guided process-tracing. Content analysis is a research technique that involves a close 
reading of relevant texts in order to make inferences about a particular phenomenon 
(Krippendorf, 2004). Rigorous content analysis of secondary documents provided most of 
the relevant information about decision points that occurred over time in the Logan Canal 
case. Our goals in using content analysis were to identify the main arguments and 
rationales used in planning decisions and the contextual details that informed those 
choices.  
Discourse analysis is a form of content analysis that focuses on the social 
construction of ideas and events through communication (Hajer, 1995; Philips and Hardy, 
2002).  To gauge public perception of the planning goals and purposes, we analyzed 
public discourse found in EIS comments, letters-to-the-editor, and field notes from 
meetings about the canal. Discourse analysis is a widely used approach to identify trends 
and themes that influence policy or explain phenomena. Hajer’s (1995) approach to 
discourse analysis seeks to uncover why some explanations of problems gain dominance 
over others in policy debates. 
Process-tracing attempts to establish causal mechanisms between events and 
outcomes in case studies by examining historical documentation (George and Bennett, 
2005). It is useful for explaining historical events and outcomes in a particular case study, 
and testing or developing theory (George and Bennett, 2005). The theory guiding the 
process-tracing is Pierson’s treatment of path dependence in policy processes (2004). 
Specific attention to sequence and timing of decisions affecting the management and use 
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of the canals helped us interpret how management approaches and decisions were 
embedded along a historical pathway. These planning decisions are embedded in the 
larger context of landscape change and urbanization.  
1860-1940. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  
Cache Valley, which straddles the border between northern Utah and southern 
Idaho, was settled in the 1860s by pioneers who were members of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (commonly referred to as Mormons). Because the valley is 
blessed with comparatively more water than surrounding areas, it was an important 
hunting and habitation site for Shoshone and Bannock tribes, and later on trappers and 
traders, before Mormon settlement (Peterson, 1997).  
Agricultural development was part of the religious philosophy and settlement 
practice of Mormon leaders who taught that the “desert will blossom as the rose” 
(Arrington and May 1975; Peterson, 1974). In addition, Mormon settlers were 
encouraged to live in tight-knit, socially coherent groups surrounded by community 
members (Ellis, 1996; Guth, 2009). Both of these ideas were encapsulated in “The Plat of 
the City of Zion,” a settlement pattern established by Mormon church leaders and 
implemented in most Mormon settlements, including Cache Valley (Jackson, 1977). The 
rigid settlement pattern included residential clusters organized into rectangular blocks 
with large lots to accommodate family-scale food production, wide roads, open irrigation 
ditches, and church meetinghouses (Francaviglia, 1978). Farmland surrounded residential 
clusters, but farmers tended to live in town (Guth, 2009; Peterson, 1997).  
Irrigation infrastructure was among the first projects the pioneers built in new 
settlements (Arrington and May, 1975; Harvey, 1989; Sadler and Roberts, 1994; Wrenn, 
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1973). In Cache County, the LN and LHPS canals were dug in 1860 using animal-drawn 
plows and intense human labor (Wrenn, 1973). Earlier irrigation canals had been installed 
in previous Mormon settlements, lending some experience to the construction (Harvey, 
1989), but for the most part, the canals were installed without the benefit of scientific 
expertise or sophisticated grading techniques (Peterson, 1997; Sadler and Roberts, 1994). 
The canals diverted water from the Logan River and ran north to farms and villages. 
Thanks to the accommodating climate and the canals, Cache Valley quickly became a 
leading agricultural production area within what is now the state of Utah (NRCS, 2011; 
Utah Irrigation Commission, 1895).  
 During the first two decades after settling Cache Valley, Mormon settlers 
managed the canal and other community resources collectively (Wrenn, 1973). Disputes 
over water were settled by a bishop according to the direction of the Mormon Church 
leadership in Salt Lake City (Sadler and Roberts, 1994). At the time, territorial 
government and church authority overlapped, so even though water disputes were settled 
within a religious organization, the control of water was quasi-governmental (Sadler and 
Roberts, 1994). During the 1880s when the territory of Utah was trying to acquire 
statehood status within the U.S., church management transitioned to private and federal 
management of water resources, including management of irrigation canals. In the 1880s, 
the LN and LHPS Canal Companies attained control of the canals under a new territorial 
law that reflected the changing regional trends toward “the free enterprise philosophy” 
(Sadler and Roberts, 1992, p. 5). Shares to the LN and LHPS water rights were sold to 
farmers and residents, who paid an annual fee for irrigation delivery. Shareholders held 
regular meetings to determine fees, prioritize maintenance tasks, and resolve water 
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distribution issues. Neither the state nor the Mormon Church regulated the operation of 
the private canal companies. 
 Throughout the Intermountain West, settlement and western expansion led to the 
establishment of certain practices to manage natural resources, particularly water. First, 
was the notion of first in time, first in right, which would later be codified into the state 
water law known as prior appropriation (Getches, 2008). The practice was initiated to 
protect early water users (who initially were miners, farmers, and settlers) from harm if 
another user began diverting water upstream (Getches, 2008; Ingram, 1982). Today, Utah 
water law guarantees the holder of a water right the ability to use a specified amount of 
water for a certain use in a particular location in perpetuity, according to the priority date 
based on when the water was first put to beneficial use. In 1903, six years after Utah was 
granted statehood, water law in Utah was codified and the LN and LHPS canals’ water 
rights were formalized with priority dates of 1860 (Peterson, 1974).  
Canal companies had a single task: to deliver irrigation water to their 
shareholders. The importance of agriculture to the economy and landscape of Cache 
Valley meant that the canal companies served a visible and integral role in the 
community. Agriculture remained Cache County’s dominant economic sector throughout 
this period, and in 1888, the Utah Agricultural College, which later became Utah State 
University, was established, further solidifying Cache County’s place as a leader in 
statewide agricultural development (Utah Irrigation Commission, 1895).  
1940-1970. SLOW URBAN GROWTH  
From 1940 to 1970, the population of Cache County grew from 30,000 to 42,000 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1995). Throughout the United States, the “baby boomer” 
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population explosion, the increasing reliance on the automobile, and the expansion of 
roadways “facilitated the movement further from the town core where land was less 
expensive” (Guth, 2009, p. 33). This was true in Cache Valley, and in the decades after 
World War II, residential development sprawled out from the city cores into farmland, 
and along the canals (see Figure 3). During this period, several homes were built along 
the Logan Bluff, the site of the 2009 landslide. Cache Valley cities did little to stand in 
the way of urban development, and canal company managers were not consulted about 
plans to build along canals.  
The increasingly urban population, disconnected from the canal by any official 
use of its irrigation water delivery, nevertheless took advantage of the canals in two 
significant, “unofficial” capacities. First, most urban stormwater runoff was diverted into 
the canals. Second, the canals were increasingly seen as cultural resources, providing 
recreational and scenic benefits to Cache Valley residents. 
Stormwater runoff in the canals was at first seen as a benefit by canal companies 
which could often use more water so they did not discourage cities from diverting 
stormwater into their systems during this period (NRCS, 2011). The convenience of using 
the canals to divert stormwater alleviated cities from the costs of installing separate 
stormwater systems. Despite increasing stormwater inputs into the canals caused by 
residential development, cities and canal companies did not officially coordinate the 
management of the canal, setting a precedent that would later cause dilemmas. 
The increase in residential development along canals was accompanied by 
increased recreational use of the water in the canal and the private maintenance roads that 
run along the canals (Kennedy and Unhanand, 1974). Common recreational activities of 
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the water in the canal included swimming, tubing, bird-watching and even fishing (before 
fish screens were installed). The roads were accessed for jogging and dog-walking. 
Kennedy and Unhanand (1974) examined the recreational use of Logan canals and 
recommended these uses be formalized, but discovered that recreation was not a priority 
to canal company officials who admitted that while efficiency was a goal for future 
improvements, they “seldom discuss recreation problems at their meetings” (1974, p. 56). 
The researchers recommended that canal companies analyze future recreation uses as 
“rationally as they do their irrigation problems” (Kennedy and Unhanand, 1974, p. 56) 
and that city and county supervision of recreation was a possible solution.  
Water storage, conveyance, and irrigation technologies were improving 
nationwide during this period and federal agencies funded large and sophisticated water 
projects throughout the U.S. West (Ingram, 1982; Reisner, 1986). Many federally-funded 
irrigation projects were installed throughout the region during this period, including the 
large Central Utah Project (Dawdy, 1989). The LHPS and LN canal companies 
recognized the inefficient design of their unlined and uncovered canals, which lost water 
to seepage and evaporation (Molina, 2008). In the 1960s the canal companies 
contemplated combining the two canals and transporting the water in pipes (Kennedy and 
Unhanand, 1974). However, no canal system redesign or replacement was implemented 
at that point in time.   
1970-2009. PUBLIC USE AND DECISION-MAKING REGARDING CANALS 
This period was marked with obvious urban encroachment along the canals (see 
Figure 3) that diversified the nature of people in neighboring land and decision-making 
linkages to the canal and the irrigation water that it delivered. The population of Cache 
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County nearly tripled from 42,000 to almost 113,000 in 40 years. Cities and towns 
responded to the growing population by expanding into agricultural land. A recent study 
estimated that farmland in Cache County is being lost at a rate of about 600 acres per 
year to development (Bear River Association of Governments, 2012).  
Rapid urban development and the growing number of impervious surfaces in the 
valley amplified the volume of stormwater entering the canals, increasing the frequency 
of flooding and structural damage to the canal and to neighboring homes (Utah Water 
Research Laboratory, 2006). After a 2005 landslide along the Logan Bluff, several pipes 
were installed in the hillside to divert naturally occurring water and inputs from uphill 
sources into the canal (Olsen, 2006). The lack of coordinated management between cities 
and canal companies over stormwater became an important issue during this period. City 
approval of residential and commercial development in potentially flood-prone areas near 
canals in Cache County (see Pitcher, 1999; Stetler, 2000) raised concerns about 
stormwater conveyance (Wilkins-Wells et al., 2005), safety (Cache County Agricultural 
Advisory Board, 2003), and liability issues (see Leavitt, 1999; Semerad, 2009). The 
decision-making responsibilities of municipalities over the management of stormwater 
became a more visible issue, but the exact nature and terms of their responsibilities over 
the canals were unclear (Nielson, 2011; Rose, 2012). Many water managers began to see 
the appeal of a water district or other semi-governmental agency to manage canals that 
would help them address these concerns (Huppi, 2011). However, the possibility of a 
publicly-funded water district in Cache Valley remains controversial. 
 In the 1990s, the LN and LHPS canal companies considered the idea of 
combining systems and lining or piping their canals to address the continuing problem of 
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seepage (Molina, 2008), but shareholders voted against these proposals because of costs 
(Huppi, 2011). Canal officials estimated that an infrastructure upgrade to the scale of the 
eventual 2012 reconstruction project would have cost approximately $300,000 in the 
1990s (Huppi, 2011).  
After the 1980s, industry and business sectors displaced agriculture as the leading 
economic sector in Cache Valley. The top employer in Cache County by the 2000s was 
Utah State University. However, agriculture remains an important part of the economy 
and landscape: nearly 80,000 irrigated acres of land produce a variety of crops, and 
sustain beef and dairy industries (Godfrey et al., 2006). The Cache County Agricultural 
Advisory Board was formed to help Cache County prioritize agriculture in policy and 
land-use decisions (Bear River Association of Governments, 2012). Envision Cache 
Valley (2008), a regional plan, aimed to concentrate growth and development in existing 
towns in order to preserve agrarian and natural lands.  
As agricultural lands in Cache County changed ownership in the process of urban 
development, municipalities often bought the water used on that land. By the 2000s, the 
majority shareholders of the LHPS canal were not agricultural producers, but 
municipalities and Utah State University (NRCS, 2011). As a result, these new 
shareholders who had more urban concerns exerted a growing influence over the 
decision-making and management of the canals.  
Recreational use of the canal increased during this time period, and became a 
nuisance for canal owners (NRCS, 2011). Some sections of the canal were fenced and 
posted to discourage recreational use. Shortly after the 2009 landslide, tubing the canals 
was prohibited by the county because of safety concerns. 
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POST 2009: EFFECTS OF LOGAN BLUFF LANDSLIDE 
The 2009 Logan Bluff landslide occurred in July, during peak irrigation season. 
The event resulted in immediate media attention during the initial rescue and clean-up 
efforts and the subsequent developments. The landslide was the catalyst for a statewide 
bill on canal safety.  
The landslide interrupted irrigation service to LN shareholders. An emergency 
system through a small canal running through private property near the Logan Bluff was 
implemented to restore delivery to some shareholders (NRCS, 2011). Immediately, canal 
owners began to plan for a reconstructed system that would enlarge the LHPS canal’s 
capacity to accommodate both canals, bypass the hazardous area of the Logan Bluff, line 
or pipe a significant portion, and restore irrigation delivery to shareholders. This was, in 
fact, the same design plan considered many times by the canals but never implemented 
(Huppi, 2011; Kennedy and Unhanand, 1974). The plan was eventually selected through 
a process mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a procedural law 
applicable to all actions funded by the federal government. 
The preferred alternative selected in the 2011 Record of Decision will address 
several issues recognized before the landslide, including stormwater, water conveyance 
inefficiency, and safety. The reconstructed canal system will transport the water from the 
point of diversion through a pipe for a certain length, reducing loss from seepage. 
Stormwater inputs will be kept separate from the piped irrigation water. Piping the canal 
will reduce safety risks from water-based recreation by eliminating this use completely. 
The Utah Legislature passed the Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act in 2010, 
just a few months after the landslide. The bill encourages (but does not require) canal 
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companies to draft management plans that would identify hazards, identify and delineate 
responsibilities shared between the canal companies and nearby municipalities, and plan 
emergency responses (Hunsaker, 2011; the Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act, 
2010).  
A year after the landslide, the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process 
began to select a construction alternative for the canal. The Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS), a federal agency, agreed to provide federal funding 
through the Emergency Watershed Protection program to cover most of the cost of the 
canal reconstruction project, managed preparation of the EIS that would examine and 
compare different alternatives for the canal reconstruction, and made the final decision. 
Although other alternatives were analyzed, the alternative that was selected was the same 
one that had been considered since the 1960s, and that had been voted down once in the 
1990s. 
 Stormwater is explicitly addressed in the EIS, but recreation is not. The EIS 
recognized that recreational use of the canal was an important public concern (see 
Chapter 3); however, recreation is usually referred to as “unauthorized use.” Recreation 
does not factor into the Record of Decision (ROD) and will not be addressed by the 
reconstruction project. Independent citizen groups are in the process of coalescing 
support for a formalized recreation corridor that would be sponsored by Cache County. 
The total cost of the project was estimated in 2012 at around $25 million, 75% of 
which would be borne by NRCS. The remaining 25% of the cost is shared among canal 
companies and cities in a 61% to 39% split. Negotiations between the cities and canal 
companies to draw up a contract that would delineate management and financial 
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responsibilities are still ongoing as of 2012, but appear to be drawing to a close (Rose, 
2012). The contract includes both a cost participation agreement and an operational 
agreement that addresses current management priorities like stormwater and irrigation 
(Rose, 2012). This document is the formalization of cooperative stormwater management 
between cities and canal companies, a need that has been recognized for decades. 
However, the problem of continued development along canal alignments and public 
access for recreation are not a part of the negotiations and remain unaddressed.  
The 2009 Logan Bluff landslide led to two important outcomes. First, the 
reconstruction project will address a portion of the linkage changes that have occurred 
over time, explicitly integrating stormwater in the design and function of the canal 
system. Second, water managers have legally formalized the coordinated management 
and financing of the canal system, both for this reconstruction project, and for activities 
and upgrades in the future (Rose, 2012). In other words, as a result of the landslide and 
subsequent NEPA process, some of the additional decision-making linkages that emerged 
over time have been formalized.   
DECISION POINTS AND ALTERNATE PATHS 
 Critical decision-points throughout the history of the canal system in Cache 
County determined the path that eventually led to the 2009 canal disaster, subsequent EIS 
process, and legislative response. In the early history of Cache County, decisions related 
to settlement, investment in agriculture, and construction of community water 
infrastructure that later became privatized were pivotal in obvious ways, setting 
precedents of water policies and management strategies that served private agricultural 
uses and established the canals in their physical alignments. In the following period of 
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slow urban growth from 1940 to 1970, the precedent of canal management uncoordinated 
with city planning was set, and future problems that would result from urban 
encroachment and stormwater management were not addressed.  
 During the period after 1970, when the population began to rapidly increase, three 
critical decision-points determined the trajectory of canal management. First, the canal 
companies, in which cities and the state of Utah became majority shareholders, had 
opportunities to upgrade the system but decided against it. The decisions to delay canal 
upgrades were made by majority vote among shareholders whose main objection to the 
project was aversion to increased shareholder fees. Delaying the upgrades increased the 
cost of the project in the long run and made the shareholders more dependent on external 
federal funding. 
Second, despite urging from Cache County Agricultural Advisory Board and 
other organizations, municipalities and canal companies did not succeed in negotiating 
formal agreements about management of stormwater, urban encroachment, or 
recreational use of the canals. Various decisions resulted in lack of coordinated 
management of municipal stormwater, urban development, and recreation between the 
municipalities and canal companies even though such coordination was promoted by 
many organizations and recognized as an important issue. The failure of these entities to 
come to formal agreements delayed the process of upgrading the canal system to account 
for new urban use linkages to the canal water. 
 Third, the lack of long-term planning for the eventual replacement of a century-
old canal system meant that local investments or savings needed to implement upgrades 
and replace inefficient infrastructure were not available. Most water infrastructure has an 
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anticipated life expectancy. Proactive investment by shareholders in future upgrades and 
maintenance of infrastructure is a potential strategy to lower overall costs and reduce 
future risks. The Cache County canal system is well over a century-old; it is doubtful that 
anyone believed that the earthen canals would last forever. The failure of canal 
companies to raise funds over time to re-invest in the canal system in order to implement 
design changes, upgrades, or repairs resulted in a situation where people’s lives were put 
at stake.  
These three decision opportunities were, in fact, points at which choices were 
made not to act. Decision points necessarily introduce trade-offs to decision-makers who 
have to weigh alternatives against each other on various criteria, particularly risk 
management. Trade-offs made in the Logan Canal case involved primarily cost and 
safety. The cost of upgrading the canal without federal investment would have fallen on 
the shoulders of canal shareholders, including municipalities that would have spread that 
cost among taxpayers. These infrastructure costs were an immediate, short-term financial 
risk, while safety was a future, ambiguous, less predictable risk. Canal company officials 
and municipal decision-makers avoided the short-term financial risks and accepted the 
long-term safety risks. Policy-makers tend to be risk averse in making decisions 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1997), and, in the face of competing risks, tend to favor decisions 
that maintain the status quo, reinforcing the path of past decision processes and policies 
(Pierson, 2004). In this case, this eventually led to the canal companies and municipalities 
incurring greater financial and safety risks in the long run. 
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THE COSTS OF COMPLACENCY 
As Intermountain West cities continue to experience rapid urban growth, more 
sophisticated and coordinated efforts between water utilities and land-use planning is 
essential. In Logan, linkages to water carried through the canal infrastructure changed in 
nature and number over time. However, the water technology remained static in a 
changing society and was eventually functionally inadequate for the diverse needs it had 
to meet. Certain decision-points surfaced that presented managers, planners, and policy-
makers with opportunities to change the trajectory of infrastructure management by 
mitigating risks along the canal and raising capital to upgrade the infrastructure to better 
meet community needs. However, because financial and political costs were assumed by 
the canal shareholders, representing just one linkage among a growing and diverse array 
of human linkages to water carried by the canals, those changes were not made.  
Decisions not to act earlier to address aging canal infrastructure had two main 
consequences. First, it made the canal system more vulnerable to accidents and disasters.  
Second, it made the entire community more financially dependent on reactive solutions 
opened up through disasters like the Logan Bluff landslide. This case suggests that a 
long-term infrastructure planning strategy that includes projections for future needs, 
financial investment for future upgrades, and a proactive, rather than reactive decision-
making approach would have been much more efficient and socially responsible than 
standing by until an emergency necessitated a response.  
Although it is easy to insist on long-term planning and call for increased up-front 
costs and taxes to upgrade and maintain water infrastructure, this case study also 
illuminated the difficulty that planners will likely encounter depending on the political 
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context within which they work. Increasing taxes or fees is a risky decision for policy-
makers (Schneider and Ingram, 1997), as is exerting government regulations on a private 
business, especially in conservative political climates such as the one in Utah. Raising 
taxes will continue to be a barrier in implementing long-term planning and infrastructure 
upgrades in urbanizing communities. However, in some senses, the future trajectory of 
the Logan Canal systems seems to be transitioning to more public use and public control. 
If the canals are managed by a public utility, additional options would be available for 
resolving issues concerning liability and the use of public funds. In some ways, the canal 
system could come full circle; from its beginnings as a communal water system through 
years of being a privately owned and regulated canal system, to once again becoming a 
more public water system. The reconstruction project that is slated to begin in 2012 could 
be the critical decision point that sets a new pathway for canal management in Logan 
well into the future.	  
This case study illustrates the importance of management decisions about water 
infrastructure over time. The temporal element of each of the events that preceded the 
2009 landslide is crucial to understanding the “how” and the “why” of the policy process 
after the landslide. Planners who face expensive infrastructure upgrades or redesign 
projects should encourage the coordination of managers, investment in the maintenance 
and future needs of water infrastructure, and early adoption of improvements when 
possible.  
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Figure 2: Population Growth in Cache County 1900-2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Figure 4. Preferred Alternative of the Logan Canal Reconstruction Environmental Impact 
Statement. Source: NRCS Logan Northern Canal Reconstruction EIS (Chapter 3.) 
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CHAPTER III 
TRIGGER EVENTS AND FRAMING DYNAMICS: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE LOGAN BLUFF LANDSLIDE2 
 In Logan, Utah, on July 11 2009, a steep hillside known as the Logan Bluff failed, 
leveling a home below and destroying a section of the Logan Northern (LN) irrigation 
canal that ran along the hill. The landslide crushed a home that sat at the bottom of the 
hill, and killed a woman and her two children who lived there. At the time, the canal was 
running at high capacity to transport irrigation water to shareholders, including farmers 
and municipalities.  
The landslide sparked legislative response on canal safety at the state level 
(Henetz 2010), and federal funding for the reconstruction of the canal was secured 
through the Emergency Watershed Protection Fund administered by the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) with the help of U.S. Senator Bob Bennett 
(Carlisle 2009). The Logan Northern (LN) Canal Company, which owned the damaged 
canal, merged with the adjacent Logan, Hyde Park, and Smithfield (LHPS) Canal 
Company to create the Cache Highline Water Users Association to facilitate a project that 
would combine the two systems (see Timeline, Fig. 7). The reconstructed canal system 
will bypass the Logan Bluff by increasing the capacity of the LHPS canal to 
accommodate both canals’ water shares (see Map 1). In 2010, NRCS, the canal 
companies, Cache County, and affected municipalities began preparing an Environmental 
Impact Statement in compliance with requirements of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This chapter co-authored by Kathryn Davis Henderson and Dr. Joanna Endter-Wada 
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The Logan Bluff landslide functioned as a trigger event, bringing attention to the 
issues of aging water infrastructure, canal safety, and private property rights in land and 
water. It brought to the surface changes in values and social needs brought about by an 
expanding urban population in a traditionally rural area. The loss of life separated the 
2009 Logan Bluff landslide from others that occurred in this same area in the past (NRCS 
2011) and attracted immediate media coverage and public scrutiny of subsequent events 
and policy responses.  
An important aspect of NEPA is the requirement for public involvement during 
the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) used to inform the decision 
making process. The procedures and documentation required by NEPA present an 
opportunity to examine public discourse within the NEPA process and trace how 
concerns raised by members of the public can influence federal decision making 
outcomes. During an EIS process, public discourse also occurs outside NEPA procedural 
boundaries in media and other public outlets. Groups and individuals generate support or 
opposition for policy changes or alternatives by creating storylines in public discourse 
(Hajer 1995, 2005) that frame target populations as either deserving or undeserving of 
policy benefits (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Public input, in and out of the NEPA 
process, provides insights into the framing dynamics and storylines employed by 
individuals and stakeholder groups. 
Trigger events often enable policy changes that would otherwise have been 
difficult by bringing visibility to issues that were overlooked or considered minor until 
the event. The increased public attention and discourse around an issue can prompt policy 
responses. In the Logan Bluff landslide case, a trigger event instigated a federal response 
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and the preparation of an EIS, as well as state legislative action. The motivation to 
analyze the discourse surrounding a single controversial EIS process stems from the need 
for a more detailed understanding of the importance of frames and their potential fragility 
following a significant trigger event. This case study analyzes the influence trigger events 
have on framing dynamics found in public discourse both inside and outside the EIS 
process, and what public discourse in the wake of the landslide revealed about challenges 
in water management in urbanizing communities of the western United States.  
 CASE STUDY CONTEXT 
Logan, Utah is the small but growing county seat of Cache County in northern 
Utah, nestled in eastern Cache Valley along the Bear River Mountains. It was settled in 
the early 1860s by Mormon pioneers (early members of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, or LDS church) who were commissioned by their leader Brigham 
Young to move to the area (Peterson 1997). Among the first infrastructure projects the 
settlers implemented in the valley were irrigation canals, which were dug across public 
domain land. Like most areas in the arid United States West, agriculture in Cache Valley 
only survives because of water infrastructure: dams store water draining from mountain 
snowmelt during the spring-time runoff and canals divert it during the hot, dry summer 
months to farms and ranches with rights or shares to irrigation water. Although the canals 
were first managed by LDS church-run cooperative organizations, over time they fell 
under the management of privately run non-profit canal corporations (Harvey 1989; 
Sadler and Roberts 1994).  
Two canals are the focus of this paper. The Logan Northern (LN) and the Logan 
Hyde Park Smithfield (LHPS) canals, both constructed in 1860 by Mormon pioneers, 
44 
	  
divert water from the Logan River and transport the water north along parallel alignments 
for approximately 9 miles (Utah Board of Water Resources 2010). As of 2010, the two 
canals had a combined total of 5,286 shares to water rights that totaled up to 
approximately 125 cubic feet per second (Logan Northern Irrigation Company 2010). 
Water rights are managed by the state according to the prior appropriation doctrine, 
which allocates water based on priority dates. Both the LN and LHPS canal companies’ 
water rights have priority dates of 1860 (Utah Division of Water Rights 2012), which are 
senior to other water rights in the area. The LHPS point of diversion is upstream from the 
LN point of diversion on the Logan River (see Map 1).  
The LHPS and LN canals are 150 years old. Both canals are aging, and allow 
some water to seep through the unlined bottoms (Molina 2008). Over time, some sections 
of Cache Valley canals were lined with concrete, but most still remain unlined, and 
nearly all have remained uncovered since their construction (Logan Northern Irrigation 
Company 2010). The canals have not been redesigned or reconstructed in any major way 
since their construction. Instead, canal owners have made repairs as needed. 
The canals deliver irrigation water to shareholders in Cache Valley. Over time, 
the character and makeup of the shareholders have changed. Early shareholders were 
exclusively farmers and ranchers. Today, a growing number of shares, including nearly 
two-thirds of LHPS shares, are owned by municipalities and Utah State University 
(NRCS 2011), which use the irrigation water for public parks and schools, secondary 
irrigation water for urban residents, and university grounds. 
Besides delivering water, the canals have adopted additional uses since their 
construction, primarily stormwater collection and recreation. As cities grew along the 
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canals, the canals became the default receptacle for stormwater runoff, saving the cities 
from having to construct their own stormwater systems. Formal agreements were never 
negotiated between cities and private canal companies to manage stormwater in the 
canals. Instead Logan and other cities traversed by the canals took advantage of the 
presence of ready-made water conveyance infrastructure and diverted runoff from 
parking lots and streets through gutters that emptied into the canals. Over time, the 
amount of stormwater entering the canal system has increased because of urbanization, 
exacerbating the risk of flooding and structural damage to the canals and adjacent 
properties (LaPlante and Carlisle 2009; Utah Water Research Laboratory 2006).  
Recreational use of the LN and LHPS canals has increased along with population 
growth (Kennedy and Unhanand 1974). Seepage from the canals feeds groundwater 
sources and vegetation and wildlife along the canal corridors (Molina 2008), making the 
canals attractive “green corridors” that traverse the valley. Runners, dog-walkers, and 
cyclists have used the private maintenance trails along the canals, and tubers and 
swimmers have recreated in the canal water (Kennedy and Unhanand 1974). 
In recent decades, increasing population and urbanization in Cache Valley has 
introduced friction between urban and rural land uses in planning (Envision Cache Valley 
2008). Rural landowners are under considerable economic pressure to sell or develop 
farmland to accommodate the growing population, and that trend is further enabled by the 
prevailing conservative political climate that opposes regulation of private property. 
However, despite losing approximately 600 acres of farmland to urban development each 
year (Bear River Association of Governments 2012), agriculture remains an important 
economic and cultural part of Cache Valley (Cache County Agricultural Advisory Board 
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2003; Godfrey et al. 2006).  The loss of farmland is a cause of concern for policymakers 
and area residents (Cache County Agricultural Advisory Board 2003). Despite a recent 
regional visioning plan that set goals to concentrate development in urban clusters, 
(Envision Cache Valley 2008), agricultural lands continue to disappear and are replaced 
with new housing and commercial developments. As a result, the canals are located in the 
same physical alignments in which they were constructed in the nineteenth century, but 
they now flow through a very different land use context.  
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
Case Study: Content and Discourse Analysis  
 The main benefits of utilizing a qualitative case study are the richness of detail 
and attention to context in the analysis. The primary goal of the case study approach is to 
trace the influence of general forces on a particular setting (Neumann 2011; Vaughan 
1992). This particular case aims to examine the social construction and framing dynamics 
of a specific target population in local public and policy discourse.  
 This paper builds on case studies that have illuminated the significance of public 
discourse in policy setting and implementation, including the use of storylines to interpret 
policy (Gelcich et al. 2005); how divergent definitions of ideas or concepts shape 
perception of surroundings (Hull et al. 2001); and how the framing of ideas affect public 
participation and trust (Borowski 2010). Using discourse analysis, Lee and Roth (2006, p. 
430) showed that conflicting use of language created “a cultural impasse” between 
residents and town council members through different storylines and frames. Social 
construction and meaning in discourse, or framing dynamics, is an important component 
in policy setting.  
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Theoretical Foundation in Policy Analysis  
 Individuals and stakeholder groups communicate their positions in public 
discourse by crafting storylines that advocate for certain policy actions. Storylines 
contain culturally meaningful language to justify or call for specific actions in policy 
development (Hajer 1995). Multiple storylines often exist that offer divergent 
explanations for the same events, advocate different policy actions, and frame individuals 
or groups in contradictory ways. These storylines compete in the arena of public 
discourse to gain legitimacy through a policy response (Hajer 1995).  
 To discuss the dynamics of social construction, or framing, in the policy-making 
process, we rely heavily on the work of Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997, 2005). They 
show how in the policy-making process, benefits and burdens are delivered to target 
populations based on framing dynamics through which events, groups, knowledge and 
social conditions are socially constructed and interpreted. Target populations are those 
groups who are specifically allocated benefits and burdens through policy mechanisms. 
Schneider and Ingram (1997) have found that target populations can be defined along two 
dimensions: deservedness and power. Four groups can be identified on continuums of 
deservedness and power (see Fig. 5): Advantaged (deserving, political powerful); 
Disadvantaged (deserving, not politically powerful); Contenders (undeserving, politically 
powerful); and Deviants (undeserving, not politically powerful). The framing of target 
populations into these four basic categorical groups makes delivering benefits and 
burdens to certain groups more palatable to the public and therefore less risky for policy-
makers (see Fig. 6).  
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 Before policies can direct benefits or burdens to anyone, the issue at the heart of 
the policy has to gain considerable momentum to reach the decision agenda. One 
important mechanism to propel an issue forward is trigger events, which can focus 
attention on a certain issue. When the issue attracts enough political will (in the political 
stream) and there are potential policy solutions (in the policy stream), a window of 
opportunity opens for policy formulation (Kingdon 1984). Sabatier and Wieble (2007, p. 
199) add that external shocks like disasters “can shift agendas, focus public attention, and 
attract the attention of key decision making sovereigns.” The Logan Bluff landslide was a 
trigger event that set off two simultaneous policy responses, the federal EIS process and 
the state legislative response. The policy responses addressed two issues that had existed 
previously at local and national levels, but were not on the formal agenda of decision 
makers until after the landslide: the needs for canal safety and water infrastructure 
upgrades (American Society of Civil Engineers 2010; Cache County Agricultural 
Advisory Board 2003; Hsiao et al. 2007; Jury and Vaux 2005).  
Discourse Analysis 
 Discourse analysis, or “the study of recorded communication,” (Babbie 2010, p. 
333) cannot be used to “determine the truthfulness of an assertion,” but rather to reveal 
messages or themes that might not be obvious to a casual observer (Neumann 2011, p. 
363). We relied on discourse contained in secondary documents to identify how the canal 
companies were framed and how these frames may have been changing. The discourse 
we analyzed included newspaper articles, letters to the editor, blog posts, personal 
communications, and some presentations given in classroom and conference settings. 
Policy materials were comprised of EIS documents (including public comments), 
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legislative debates, and the Utah Code. These texts were analyzed to identify the social 
constructions implied in each communication and to identify the storylines embedded 
therein. Because the canal companies were the main beneficiaries of the reconstruction 
project, this analysis focuses on the framing dynamics regarding the canal shareholders 
and leaders. 
 From January to May 2010, several presentations given to a Utah State University 
water law and policy class by professionals, canal company representatives, and resident 
activists highlighted some of the competing narratives surrounding the Logan Bluff 
landslide. These presentations provided us with preliminary guidance for the rest of the 
analysis.  
The public discourse analysis relied on two main sources of public debate: the 
EIS scoping comments and media reports. The policy discourse analysis focused on the 
debate and official language of the state legislative response and the EIS documents. 
EIS Scoping Comments  
Comments submitted during the EIS process, available on public record, were the 
primary data source to analyze how local residents and canal shareholders framed the 
canal company and municipalities. It cannot be assumed that these comments are 
proportionally representative of the views of the general public, but they provide insight 
into the different concerns held by community members and the range of points-of-view. 
In reading the public comments, our two primary questions were: How does each 
commenter frame the canal company in terms of deservedness and power? And if the 
landslide is addressed, how is it tied to the commenters’ frame of the canal company and 
proposed alternatives, i.e. what is the storyline presented? 
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Media Discourse  
The local paper, the Herald Journal, was our main source for media-related 
discourse about the Logan Bluff landslide, both in news articles and letters to the editor. 
These materials were probed in much the same way as the EIS comments. Typically in 
news articles, points-of-view were rarely explicitly stated so we identified themes, or 
culturally symbolic language (Hajer 1995), when referring to different target populations 
to identify frames embedded in the media discourse. Media reports were a rich source of 
data for identifying storylines, because many articles contained a summary that traced 
and interpreted the events chronologically.  
To trace how storylines and frames in the public discourse were translated or addressed in 
policy, we analyzed the EIS documents (public notices, public meeting transcriptions, 
draft and final EIS, and the ROD) and the state legislative response, a bill entitled The 
Water Conveyance Facility Safety Act. The Logan Bluff landslide was cited as the 
impetus for creating this bill (Hartvigsen 2010; Henetz 2010; Raymond 2010). A 
presentation to the Water Law and Policy class at Utah State University by the bill’s 
sponsor, Representative Fred B. Hunsaker, provided insight into the reasons and 
rationales behind the bill’s provisions (Hunsaker 2011). The policy responses were 
analyzed primarily to trace to what extent storylines and frames from the public discourse 
influenced the delivery of burdens and benefits to the canal companies. 
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RESULTS 
Framing Dynamics in EIS Discourse 
 The canal companies were framed as both deserving and undeserving of benefits 
in several different storylines contained in public discourse. Deservedness is conceived in 
terms of the benefit of federal financial assistance, or the burden of regulation. The canal 
companies appeared to be framed as powerful in all storylines, although the power 
dimension was more explicitly described in some storylines than in others. The frames 
place the canal companies in two of the four quadrants: Contenders, and Advantaged. 
Table 1 summarizes the five storylines, of which three contained primarily negative 
(Contender) frames of the canal company, and two contained positive (Advantaged) 
frames. The canal companies are framed as Advantaged in storylines that associated them 
with agricultural producers and highlighted the need for efficient water delivery. The 
canal companies are framed as Contenders in three ways: in discussions over whether 
federal funding was deserved; in discussions about the hazards remaining on the hillside 
where the landslide occurred; and in discussions about covering and piping the canal. 
Storyline 1: Inappropriate Use of Federal Funding (Contender)  
Many people viewed the Logan Bluff landslide to be at least partly due to lax 
maintenance of the LN canal by the canal company. This storyline framed the LN Canal 
Company as a Contender, therefore delivering the benefit of federal emergency funding 
to the LNCC was seen as inappropriate (see Fig. 5). Examples of these storylines are 
expressed in the following excerpts from two letters to the editor: “In Logan, life is 
cheap, accountability absent, police investigations conclude before they begin and 
property is more important than lives (Graham 2009);” and “What great ‘bailout’ for a 
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private company that neglected to maintain and update their … delivery system” 
(Watkins 2011). 
A number of residents believe the Logan Bluff section of LN canal is not 
dangerous and wish to see the canal restored to its former state. Approximately 15% of 
the nearly 100 comments submitted during the scoping period expressed a desire to 
reconstruct the canal in its current alignment (NRCS 2010, p. 11). The option to restore 
the canal in its former alignment along the Logan Bluff was rejected during the EIS 
because of liability issues. 
While the LN Canal Company was being framed as a culprit, the LHPS Canal 
Company was framed as taking advantage of a tragic situation for their financial benefit. 
The preferred alternative would upgrade a major section of the LHPS Canal, which was 
not affected by the Logan Bluff landslide, the event that led to receipt of the federal 
funding. The LHPS Canal Company was framed as opportunistic for taking emergency 
funding provided after the landslide to upgrade their outdated but still functioning 
system. One LN shareholder commented, “It is against the law to steal water from one 
canal and put it into another canal.” The frame of the LHPS Canal Company as 
opportunistic was reinforced when a LHPS Canal Company official exclaimed during a 
meeting, “We’ll get a gold-plated canal at a real discount price, it does not get any better 
than the situation we have” (Patrick and Burgess 2009). Many residents felt that the canal 
companies were so enthusiastic about the LHPS reconstruction solution that the process 
was inherently biased against other alternatives (Keller 2011). Another letter alleged that 
NRCS was fraudulently administering Emergency Watershed Protection funds and 
“subsidizing benefits unrelated to the landslide” (Watkins 2010). 
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Storyline 2: Hazardous Hillside Canal (Contender) 
Another negative frame is embedded in discourse surrounding the landslide zone 
around the Logan Bluff, which experts say still poses a danger to nearby homes 
(Fotheringham 2011). In this storyline, the landslide was a tragic consequence of the 
canal’s placement along a dangerous hillside and the Logan Bluff presents a continuing 
hazard for the residents that live nearby. Many public scoping comments insist that the 
emergency funding should go to remediating the hazardous site where the disaster 
occurred. Running through this storyline is concern about future landslides along the 
Logan Bluff: “There is not a day that I don’t fear for our neighbors left behind on Canyon 
Road, and wonder what will happen” (NRCS 2010, p. S-64). The canal company is seen 
as irresponsible for retaining the canal along a hillside known to be prone to landslides, 
failing to mitigate known dangers or warn neighbors of the risks, and abandoning the 
collapsed canal for a new solution without addressing the continuing dangers posed to 
nearby residents (Huenemann 2010). Like Storyline 1, the canal company is framed as a 
Contender in this storyline, but in a contradictory way; In Storyline 1, the landslide was 
attributed not to the natural hazards of the hillside but to the neglectful management of 
the canal. Essentially these two storylines describe the landslide and hillside canal in 
opposite ways, but both frame the canal companies as Contenders.  
Storyline 3: Lining and Piping of the Canals (Contender) 
The third topic that highlighted a Contender frame of the canal companies was the 
proposed piping of a large portion of the canal system. Recreational use, although never 
formally authorized, was a common use of the open canals (Kennedy and Unhanand 
1974). Additionally, many area residents value the running water, the waterfowl and 
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other wildlife that utilize the canal water, and the aesthetic and scenic amenities the open 
canal provides. The storyline here depicts the open canal system as a longtime 
community benefit, providing recreational, environmental, aesthetic, and cultural value 
beyond its official uses of transporting irrigation water. The canal company is framed as 
belligerent for ignoring public values and unfairly depriving the community of continued 
enjoyment of these benefits. This was pointed out by some people submitting comments 
as disingenuous considering the use of public funds to reconstruct the canal. As one 
resident said, “I would argue that given the large public expenditure on this project, the 
balance should tip towards benefiting the tax payer rather than the irrigator” (NRCS 
2010, p. S-14).   
Storyline 4: Efficiency and future water needs (Advantaged)  
In public comments, some residents and shareholders expressed concern for 
improving efficiency of water delivery in light of projected population growth. Indeed, 
population is expected to boom over the next few decades, and many people anticipate 
greater pressure on the area’s limited water resources. For this reason, a better designed 
delivery system that eliminates seepage and monitors flow effectively is seen as a 
community benefit. Many commenters mentioned the need for long-term water planning 
in the valley and support the reconstruction project because it upgrades an aging system 
for one that delivers irrigation water and diverts stormwater more effectively than the 
current system. The framing of the canal companies in this storyline is less explicit; they 
are simply the managers of important water infrastructure that need upgrading. Because 
they are not framed negatively, and the storyline advocates for the reconstruction of the 
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preferred alternative (delivering significant benefits to the canal companies), it is a 
positive framing. 
 Some confusion existed on where the water savings will go. Many commenters 
mentioned that the water formerly lost to seepage could be captured and applied to more 
acreage. At one public meeting a small group of shareholders discussed how saving and 
selling that captured water will help alleviate the cost share required by the canal 
company (Draft EIS Public Meeting Notes March 31, 2011). However, according to Utah 
water law, any water that is saved by increasing the efficiency of the canal will remain in 
the Logan River and is available to downstream appropriators. A water right holder, like 
the canal company, cannot apply water saved through improving efficiency to irrigate 
more acreage, because that would illegally enlarge the water right. Instead, any unused 
portion of a water right is subject to forfeiture to the state to be reallocated elsewhere (see 
Utah Code Title 73-1-4). One commenter suspected that had canal shareholders been 
better informed about water law regarding saved (or unused) water, they might not have 
voted to approve the project (NRCS 2010, p. S-93).  
Storyline 5: Agricultural Needs of Shareholders (Advantaged) 
This storyline is a manifestation of the powerful positive view most residents have 
of agriculture. Many comments connected the private needs of the irrigation company 
shareholders to farming and other agricultural practices, which are highly valued in the 
region, and therefore framed the canal companies as deserving of the federal assistance 
and an upgraded water delivery system. One shareholder that supported the 
reconstruction design to combine and upgrade the two canals commented: “The money to 
repair the upper [LHPS] canal and replace the LN canal would be the best investment. 
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The purpose of the canal is to deliver water to the shareholders. It is critical to 
farmers/agricultural users” (NRCS 2010, p. S-5). Certain public comments reveal that 
some people see the canal as bringing community-wide benefits. One resident explained 
in a scoping comment: “The use of public dollars for private irrigation companies, though 
criticized by some, if used for the improvements that will serve agricultural users and 
municipalities will benefit either directly or indirectly every citizen” (NRCS 2010, p. S-
20).  The need to move quickly to restore irrigation service to shareholders is also 
expressed in several public comments: “The reconstruction needs to be expedited so that 
for irrigators not now receiving adequate water, their needs are met sooner than later. 
Family livelihoods and the ability to maintain agriculture land in agriculture are 
threatened by further delay” (NRCS 2010, p. S-20). 
Framing Dynamics in the Media Accounts 
Positive and negative frames appeared in narratives presented in media and news 
reports; however, the language is generally less direct in assigning blame or asserting 
opinions. Negative frames are implied in a media storyline about the public safety 
problems presented by canals. In many articles, the canal companies are seen as needing 
more oversight and management from government agencies. The Herald Journal 
published an article shortly after the disaster that supported the actions of Lieutenant 
Governor Herbert to establish a task force to look into canal safety issues. “Herbert 
directed task force members – made up of engineers, lawmakers, and canal owners – to 
determine the state’s role in overseeing and identifying ‘high-hazard’ canals. ‘I had the 
opportunity to observe the canal and mudslide that occurred in Logan, and it caused me 
to have concern when it comes to oversight and the care and maintenance of our 
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waterways,’ Herbert said” (Patrick and Burgess 2009). These early articles probably 
contributed to public perceptions that the canal company was at least partly to blame for 
the disaster. Frames are also embedded in the news in more subtle ways. Consider the 
following excerpt from a Herald Journal article, “Almost a No-Man’s Land” by Jay 
Patrick: “While Logan voted to support the company in its efforts pursuing the 3100 
North option, officials last week wondered how it is that none of the so-called emergency 
money is planned to go toward stabilizing the Canyon Road Slope. ‘Is it right to solve the 
ills of the upper canal with emergency money?’ [A councilman asked.]” (Patick 2010a). 
The article continues to quote other officials on how the EWP funding should also 
sponsor efforts to stabilize the landslide zone, an effort not included in the EIS preferred 
alternative. The idea of addressing the landslide zone was mentioned several times in the 
following months in Herald Journal articles related to the canal reconstruction project, 
reflecting Storyline 2 above (Geraci 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; 2011; Patrick 2010). Negative 
frames about the canal companies are revealed in the media by the continued publication 
of these types of articles that feature opinions questioning the canal company’s 
deservedness to receive public funding. 
 The canal companies and the reconstruction plan are framed positively in some 
media reports as well. Most of the positive frames occur in discussion about the need for 
water use efficiency and future water needs of the growing valley, and about farmers and 
their need for water to support their agricultural practices. “[The reconstruction] project is 
in the works to restore irrigation water to users impacted by a canal breach in Logan more 
than two years ago… [An NRCS official] concluded that he hopes ‘we can begin to move 
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forward and restore the water delivery to those people who really need it, which are the 
farmers who haven’t had the full dose of water for the last two years” (Geraci 2011).  
The emphasis is often placed on the impact the landslide had on shareholders. The 
farmers who own shares and are reliant on water delivered from the LN canal are framed 
herein as a victim, not a culprit, of the disaster. This is a contrast to the frame of the canal 
company itself, which is owned by the shareholders, as the culprit (see Storyline 1). The 
individual shareholders may be more positively seen than their corporate group. 
Framing Dynamics in Policy Documents and Legislation 
 The EIS documents and The Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act (2010) are 
the primary sources for analyzing framing dynamics in policy documents and legislation. 
These documents were analyzed to trace how storylines and frames influenced the 
delivery of benefits and burdens to the canal companies. 
 The EIS documents frame the canal companies in positive ways and contradicts 
the frames embedded in the public discourse storylines. Storyline 1 (that the canal 
contributed to the landslide) is countered in the EIS in which the shareholders are framed 
as victims, not a cause of the landslide. “During the summer of 2009, the slope of a 
hillside in Logan failed. As a result of this failure (landslide), a section of the LN Canal 
broke away. Three people were killed by the landslide, and the Logan & Northern 
Irrigation Company, the canal company that operates and maintains the LN Canal, has 
not been able to use the canal to distribute water since the failure” (NRCS 2011:2-1, 
emphasis added).  
The landslide and breach of the canal are described as separate events, the former 
causing the latter, not the other way around. The EIS counters the claims of the 
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commenters who believed that the landslide was the fault of the canal company: “Based 
on the long history of landslides in this area and the hydrology and geologic conditions of 
the Logan Bluff, future landslides are likely to occur in the area…” (NRCS 2011, p. S-
14). Repairing the canal to its former state along the hillside without making significant 
changes to stabilize the hillside would therefore be irresponsible. 
Storyline 2, which advocates for remediation of the Logan Bluff to prevent future 
landslides, is addressed in the ROD, which includes purchasing fourteen homes within 
the 2009 landslide zone. This was an addition made to the Final EIS (absent from the 
Draft EIS) due to public concerns. However, outside of condemning and removing the 
fourteen structures, the ROD includes no additional effort to stabilize the hillside or 
purchase other structures near but outside of the 2009 landslide zone. NRCS and the 
cooperating agencies maintained that stabilizing the entire hillside was outside of the 
scope of the reconstruction project (NRCS 2011). 
Storyline 3, which focuses on the cultural and recreational value of the open 
canal, is addressed in the EIS, but the idea of the open canal is re-framed in terms of 
safety. The idea of safety is stated as the primary driver of the project consistently and 
often: “[The purpose and need for the reconstruction is] to design and construct an 
irrigation system that will safely restore irrigation water delivery to LN shareholders 
(NRCS 2011, p. S-11, emphasis added).” Safety is an important theme embedded in the 
EIS and a justification for covering and piping a significant section of the canal and for 
avoiding any option that would repair the existing canal along the landslide zone. 
 The EIS also employs distancing language to delegitimize the concerns regarding 
the environmental and cultural values associated with open canals central in Storyline 3. 
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Consider the following statements: “People who do not live along the canals but who use 
them for recreation also perceive the canals as an important resource that adds to their 
overall quality of life” (NRCS 2011, p. S-26); “The quality of life of people living along 
the canals is based on perceptions of the canals as a benefit that enhances their properties 
and/or experiences” (NRCS 2011, p. S-26); and, “Some people who live along the LN 
and LHPS Canals in the study area value the appearance and presence of the canal 
system. These landowners feel that the canals’ appearance and the water conveyed 
through the canals are amenities that contribute to their quality of life” (NRCS 2011, p. 2-
6). Use of the words “perceive,” “perception,” and “feel” is significant because it implies 
that this view is not a fact, but merely a perception; the residents feel the canal is an 
amenity, rather than the canal is an amenity. This language works to distance the official 
position from those of the residents who think this way, devaluing Storyline 3. The use of 
canals for recreation is referred to in the rest of the EIS as unauthorized or illegal. 
“People have historically waded and floated in the canals, even though the canals are 
generally posted for no trespassing and are not safe or legal recreational features” (NRCS 
2011, p. 3-10). To bolster support for enclosing the canal, the EIS points to all the 
advantages the closed system would have in terms of operation and maintenance: 
“Enclosing the canal would prevent debris from accumulating along the canal alignments, 
which would help improve water quality and eliminate operational problems such as 
clogged headgates and local flooding associated with buildup of debris. Enclosing the 
canal would also enable separation of irrigation water and stormwater, which would also 
protect the quality of water in the canals” (NRCS 2011, p. 3-10).  
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 Storyline 4, which highlights the need to improve efficiency for long-term water 
delivery needs, is a central storyline embedded in the EIS. Piping the canal will “conserve 
about 7,500 acre-feet of water per year by repairing leaks in the Logan Canyon section of 
the LHPS Canal, a segment that currently loses a substantial percentage of water that is 
diverted from the Logan River” (NRCS 2011, p. 3-54). An important aspect of the 
reconstructed canal system that was mostly absent from the public discourse was 
stormwater, a “new” use of the canal. The EIS states that stormwater inputs were seen in 
the past as beneficial, however, “as the area has become more urbanized, the amount of 
municipal stormwater entering the canal system often exceeds the system’s capacity, 
which causes flooding” (NRCS 2011, p. 2-3). The preferred alternative includes design 
elements to accommodate stormwater runoff from the cities the canals bisect. This 
function was viewed by cities and canal managers as essential, but it was not a salient 
issue in the public comments. The reason for this could be that stormwater diversion is 
“invisible” to residents in the area. The dual functioning upgraded canal system is touted 
in the EIS as better equipped to handle future water delivery and disposal needs and 
improve overall operational efficiency.  
 Storyline 5, which emphasizes restoring water for shareholders, particularly 
agricultural producers, is embedded in the “Purpose and Need” for the reconstruction 
project. Delivering irrigation water to shareholders was the underlying justification for 
the entire project: “[The 2009] landslide and breach have prevented the canal from 
distributing water and has required the indefinite closure of a section of the canal. This 
closure affects other parts of the local irrigation water delivery system, with the result 
that the canal is not delivering all water allocated to local water shareholders. The 
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[purpose of the proposed action is] to restore safe water delivery capability to the LN 
Canal” (NRCS 2011a). 
 The Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act of 2010 contains frames contained in 
Storylines 1 and 5, which are positive and negative. The law authorizes grant and loan 
assistance to canal owners and operators for repairs and improvements contingent on 
them adopting a management plan. The plan requires canal companies to prepare an 
emergency response strategy with local emergency response officials (Water Conveyance 
Facilities Safety Act 2010 § 73-10-33); address stormwater management with 
municipalities; and communicate to cities, municipalities, and planning and zoning 
departments with information about potential risk locations along their canals. There are 
two controversial points to this law. First, the management plans are optional, and 
second, canal management plans that are submitted to the state are protected from public 
access (Water Conveyance Facilities Safety Act 2010 § 63G-2-305). These two elements 
of the bill are indicative of the state legislature’s pro-agricultural stance, i.e. Storyline 5.  
The law itself contained generally positive frames of the canal companies, but 
delivered some lenient burdens, or “hollowed sanctions” (Schneider and Ingram 1997; 
see Fig. 5, p. 113). The bill itself can be interpreted as a tacit suggestion that more 
oversight of the canal is justified because of previous lax management of potential 
hazardous areas, a nod to Storyline 1, but it stops short of instituting enforceable 
regulations. The safety management plan is burdensome, but not mandatory. 
Understanding the framing of the canal companies as “Advantaged” and “Contenders” in 
the public discourse helps explain the language of the bill. 
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Summary 
 In summary, certain storylines and frames from the public discourse were 
embedded in policy response and formulation. Storyline 1 (that the canal companies were 
failing to mitigate risk) was embedded in H.B. 60, but not in the EIS where the canal 
companies were framed as victim, not cause of the landslide. Storyline 2, which 
advocated for using the federal funding to stabilizing the hillside was addressed partially 
in the EIS through the stipulation that fourteen structures within the 2009 landslide zone 
will be condemned and removed using some of the federal funding. Storyline 3, which 
describes the open canals as a historic, environmental, and cultural amenity was 
addressed but reframed in the EIS as unsafe. Storylines 4 and 5, which contain the two 
positive frames are embedded in both H.B 60 and the EIS. The legislative response 
delivered only mild burdens, and the EIS will deliver an upgraded canal system at a 
highly subsidized cost. The ways in which these storylines competed and contradicted 
each other in the public discourse is reflected in the bundle of burdens and benefits 
delivered to the canal companies through the policy responses. 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this interpretive analysis was to examine the framing dynamics 
after a dramatic trigger event, and how those framing dynamics influenced the policy 
response to that trigger event. The proliferation of alternate storylines that framed the 
canal companies in multiple and competing ways suggests that the frames were 
destabilized by the trigger event itself. Before the 2009 landslide, issues relating to canal 
management were not extremely controversial. After the landslide, canal managers were 
seen as lazy and innocent of canal disrepair, victims and cause of the landslide, and 
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deserving and undeserving of policy benefits. The competing storylines were presented in 
newspaper reports, blogs, and the policy responses themselves. We suggest that trigger 
events can shock the prevailing system of frames, destabilizing them and introducing new 
frames. Since the frames were in a state of flux after the landslide, at least temporarily, 
the decision making process was controversial and added the potential for conflict.  
 Frames are utilized to generate support for certain policy actions. During the EIS 
process and legislative response, frames were articulated by policy-makers to justify the 
delivery of benefits and burdens to target populations. The EIS embodied mostly positive 
frames of the canal companies, delivering exclusively benefits, while the state legislative 
response incorporated multiple frames and delivered a mixed policy response with both 
benefits and burdens. There are several possible explanations for this difference, 
including the possibility that the EIS was generally favorable to the canal companies 
because the managing agency, NRCS, is an agricultural agency. The state legislature may 
positively view agriculture as well, but they are also answerable to the voting public, and 
the competing frames of the canal companies in the public discourse are reflected in the 
legislative response. Trigger events, therefore, can act as frame destabilizers that can 
quickly change the social context in which decision makers have to operate. 
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Figure 5. Deservedness and Power of target populations. 
Source: Schneider and Ingram 1997, Policy Design for Democracy, p. 109. 
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Fig. 6 Risk to Policymakers in delivering benefits to target groups 
Source: Schneider and Ingram 1997, Policy Design for Democracy, p. 114. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 CONCLUSION 
 The challenges facing planners and policy-makers in Logan, Utah, are not unique. 
The factors that made this particular case the focus for study was the intersection of 
several relevant policy issues. Aging infrastructure, private and public control of water, 
rural and urban land use and water issues, population growth in the U.S. West, and public 
influence on the policy process are all important dimensions of the Logan Canal case 
study. Each of these dimensions adds complexity to the decision making process. The 
analysis of the Logan Canal case study, conducted through a content-based situational, 
interpretive approach, illuminated several key dimensions of policy processes. 
 First, this analysis illustrated the crucial path dependent role that water 
infrastructure plays in defining the decision making process and outcomes about water 
management. The canal system in Logan, Utah, although aging and outdated, physically 
limited the possible outcomes that managers could consider. The physical water 
infrastructure also forced the multiple decision makers to cooperate. The lack of 
coordination during the transitional period of the canal system (when it began to 
accumulate new urban uses) could not last. The landslide probably hastened cooperation 
between the cities and canal companies, but such cooperation was inevitable to align 
formal decision making about the infrastructure with the uses that it had come to serve. 
 Second, social construction of groups has a large impact on policy-making, 
affecting policy processes and outcomes, as well as their perceived acceptability. Though 
the socially constructed storylines were contradictory, most of them framed the primary 
target population – the private canal companies – as undeserving of the benefits of federal 
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financial assistance, so the level of acceptability of the final decision to reconstruct the 
canal with federal assistance was low. The fact that these storylines were not embedded 
in the policy response made it seem like the process was biased in favor of the target 
population, whether or not this was actually the case. 
 Third, trigger events can destabilize frames that may have been stable, or at least 
changing slowly before the trigger event. This can make policy decision making 
processes more complicated with regards to addressing public concerns. The landslide 
event was presented in early media reports as a possible result of the breach of the canal, 
and subsequent storylines in the public discourse framed the canal companies as culprits. 
Before the landslide, widely recognizable frames of the canal companies were absent 
from the public discourse, although farmers and agricultural producers generally were 
seen positively within the context of Cache Valley and its history. Understanding that the 
new negative frame became prevalent after the landslide, it was predictable that the 
reconstruction project would be controversial. Being met with public resistance surprised 
some policy-makers who were used to widespread support for agricultural-related 
improvements. This response emphasizes the importance of storylines and frames in 
influencing public acceptance of policy decisions.  
 Policy-makers and planners who are faced with decisions about water 
management in a changing societal context should therefore: 1) conduct social 
assessment on the various ways people are linked to water and the infrastructure through 
which it is delivered to end users; 2) pursue cooperative management with other decision 
making linkage groups early on; 3) attempt to understand and address the public frames 
78 
	  
and storylines that influence the policy process; and, 4) after a trigger event, pay close 
attention to the way the trigger event affects the social environment. 
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